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more categories of unilateral error, codification might be desirable. Experience
has already been had with this solution in Germany.41
Although Professor Williston maintains that "a doctrine which permits the
rescission of a contract on account of unilateral mistake approaches nearly to a
contradiction of the objective theory of mutual assent in the formation of contracts to which the modem law seems generally to have tended,"42 he concedes
the workability of a "subjective" theory of mistake when coupled with an
estoppel or reliance interest theory.43 The approach to unilateral mistake suggested here would detract nothing from the many advantages of the "objective" theory but would alleviate an occasional harshness. The reasons of
policy44 which dictate relief for mutual mistake apply as well to unilateral error.
It seems more important that the law be determined by social policy and notions of fairness than that it be symmetrically "objective" or "subjective."

HEALTH INSPECTION OF PRIVATE DWELLING
WITHOUT SEARCH WARRANT
In answer to a complaint that the halls of a private dwelling were littered
with trash and garbage, a uniformed health inspector of the District of Columbia, accompanied by a police officer, asked permission to enter the dwelling and
investigate. The owner refused to unlock her door and admit him, insisting that
she was under no obligation to do so since neither the inspector nor the police
officer had a search warrant. As a result of this refusal, the owner was convicted
of a violation of the health law., The Supreme Court affirmed the reversal of the
4' German Civil Code § rig (2), states that unilateral impalpable mistake entitles the mistaken party to rescission. Under Section 122 the nonmistaken party may receive damages for
injuries suffered because of reliance upon the validity of the contract.
425 Williston, Contracts § 1579 (rev. ed. 1937).
43Ibid., at § 1536 n. 4.

44Note 3 supra. While it is often said that relief is not given for unilateral mistake because
the nonmistaken party relied on the existence of a binding obligation, this is true as well of the
party resisting relief in a case of mutual mistake.
x"[lit shall be the duty of every person occupying any premises, or any part of any premises,
in the District of Columbia, or, if such premises be not occupied, of the owner thereof, to keep
such premises or part.., clean and wholesome. If upon inspection by the Health Officer or
an inspector of the Health Department, it be determined that any such part thereof, or any
building, yard... is not in such condition as herein required, the occupant or occupants of
such premises or part, or the owner thereof.., shall be notified and required to place the
same in a clean and wholesome condition; and in case any person shall fail or neglect to place
such premises or part in such condition within the time allowed by said notice, he shall be
liable to the penalties hereinafter provided. § 2.
"That any person violating or aiding or abetting in violating, any of the provisions of these
regulations, or interfering with or preventing any inspection authorized thereby, shall be
deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, and shall, upon conviction.., be punished by a fine of not
less than $5.oo nor more than $45.oo. § 1 2." District of Columbia v. Little, 339 U.S. I, 4 n. 2
(1950).
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trial court's verdict.2 However, the decision was not based on the opinion of the
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia,3 which held that the owher was
protected by the Fourth Amendment4 and that the inspection of a private
dwelling without a warrant was an unreasonable exercise of the police power.
Instead, the Court chose to avoid the constitutional question and held that
there had been no interference with the health inspector within the meaning of
the inspection statute.
The question of whether the owner's acts amounted to interference within the
meaning of the statute does not appear to have been argued at any stage of the
litigation.s The lower courts based their decisions solely on the constitutional
grounds. The District of Columbia statute provided a penalty for anyone "interfering with or preventing any inspection." 6 The dissenting justices, Burton
and Reed, together with the lower court judges, apparently felt that since the
defendant refused to unlock her door, there had been an effective interference
-with the inspection procedure. Nevertheless, the majority, focussing upon the
word "interfere" and ignoring the word "prevent" held that the statute was not
meant to extend to actions of this type.7 This distortion was caused by the
2 District of Columbia v. Little, 339 U.S. i (ig5o). justices Burton and Reed dissented.
They believed that the statute had been violated, but that health inspection did not require
a warrant.
3District of Columbia v. Little, 178 F. 2d 13 (1949). The Municipal Court opinion is in
62 A. 2d 874 (1948). judge Holtzoff of the court of appeals dissented. He maintained that the
Fourth Amendment only required a warrant in the case of a search for evidence or for other
criminal matters. Since the inspection in the instant case was not related to the dangers likely
in the issuance of general warrants with their exploratory searches, the dissent expressed the
opinion that the Fourth Amendment was not applicable. It was also stated that the warrant requirement would result in judicial supervision of an administrative job, an undesirable
result. The cases cited in the dissent, however, do not involve the invasion of a private dwelling,
but are concerned with searches of hotels, automobiles and other instances of federal seizure
which have traditionally been excluded from the amendment's provisions.
4 "The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, shall
not be violated, and no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the person or things to

be seized."
' District of Columbia v. Little, 339 U.S. i, 4n. i (i95o).
6Note i supra.
7The Court's interpretation of the statute, in relation to the facts of this particular case,
does not appear to be reasonable. Short of an actual physical assault on the inspector, it is
difficult to imagine a more effective means of preventing the inspection than locking the
door. If Section 12 of the statute Was not drafted with such an obvious means as this in view, its
whole purpose is nugatory. In United States v. McDonald, 8 Biiss. 439, 448 (C.C.A. Wis.,
1879) the court construed a statute which provided a penalty for anyone who "knowingly
and willfully obstructs, resists or opposes any officer of the United States in serving or attempting to serve... process or warrant." In interpreting this section the court said: "The statute,
however, does not limit the offense to resistance alone, it includes also willful acts of obstruction or opposition; and to obstruct is to interpose obstacles or impediments, to hinder, impede or in any manner interrupt or prevent, and this term does not necessarily imply the
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Court's determination to avoid several important and controversial questions.
To accomplish it the Court took refuge in a long established policy by which
constitutional issues are ignored if a valid alternative point of statutory construction or general law is presented.8
In avoiding the determination of these constitutional problems, the Court
emasculated the District of Columbia health inspection statute. This decision
prevents a health inspector from entering a private dwelling even with a warrant, as long as the door is locked, because such conduct is not "interference"
within the meaning of the statute. It is ironical that although certiorari was
granted because "the case raises important questions concerning legal provisions
for protecting the health of the people by special and periodic inspection and
elimination of potential sources of disease," 9 the decision established a simple
loophole for those who may wish to resist inspection. The Court also refused an
excellent opportunity to establish an important precedent on the three major
points embodied in the opinion of the court of appeals: the scope of health inspection; the constitutional requirements for the entry of a private dwelling;
and the civil liberties protection needed to safeguard citizens from the arbitrary
intrusion of governmental officers.
District of Columbia v. Little, which clearly presented these three points for
decision, represents a departure from the previous litigation arising under the
Fourth Amendment."' There was no attempt to apprehend a criminal, make an
arrest, or seize evidence of a crime. The circumstances involved merely a
routine inspection, the kind which any large city undertakes every week. The
employment of direct force, or the exercise of direct means. It included any passive, indirect
or circuitous impediments to the service or execution of process; such as hindering or preventing an officer by not opening a door." This interpretation of "obstruct, resist and oppose" is
contrary to the Supreme Court's partial reliance on the lack of force or threatened force in the
Little case by which they justify a holding of noninterference. It also equates "hindering"
with "preventing," although the Supreme Court sought to distinguish the District of Columbia statute because it did not use the words "hindering" or "refusing to permit any lawful
inspection."
'Siler v. Louisville & Nashville R. Co., 213 U.S. 175 (19o9); Light v. United States, 220
U.S. 523 (1911); Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 297 U.S. 288, 347 (1936). However, constitutional questions can not be avoided unless it is "fairly possible" to decide the
case on the statutory level. Rescue Army v. Municipal Court of Los Angeles, 331 U.S. 549,
569 (1947). In the Rescue case, which the Court cites to support this rule, Justices Murphy
and Douglas dissented for the express reason that the constitutional issues were clearly raised

and the timewas "ripe for this Court to supply the definitive judicial answers." Ibid., at 585.

9 District of Columbia v. Little, 339 U.S. 1, 2-3 (ig5o).
1O
See Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145, 175-S& (1947), where in his dissent, Justice
Frankfurter compiled a list of the twenty-six Supreme Court cases arising from 1914 to 1938 in
which the Fourth Amendment was involved. Each of these cases was concerned in some
manner with a crime, or with the payment of a penalty or a forfeiture. The Supreme Court's
interpretation of the Fourth Amendment has in fact been criticized as a sentimental concession

to criminals and a positive obstruction to criminal justice. This view is discussed in Waite,
Reasonable Search and Research, 86 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 623 (1938).
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health departments of such large cities as Los Angeles- and Chicago12 operate
in the same manner in answering complaints. Their statutes also impose fines
upon those who interfere with the inspections and in general are similar to the
District of Columbia statute.
Officials's of the health and law departments of the city of Chicago say that
complaints of the Little type are not unusual. In answering them, the Chicago
health inspectors state the nature of the complaint, show their credentials and
ask permission to enter. Usually no objection is made. However, the officials
report that from time to time an individual will refuse to admit the inspector.
When this occurs the law department initiates a prosecution under the authority
of the health statute. It was reported that these interferences are the exception,
and to the knowledge of these officials, the defense of constitutional immunity
has never been raised.14
It is surprising that there had been no decision on the constitutionality of
health inspection of a private dwelling without a warrant. In fact, the Little case
was one of the few decisions in which the application of the Fourth Amendment
11"No person shall refuse to permit or allow the Health Officer or any of his deputies,
agents or inspectors of the Department to enter, inspect, or examine or interfere with or hinder
such Health Officer or his deputies, agents, or any inspector of the Department in the inspection
or examination of any portion of any building, premises, lot, vehicle, steamboat, boat, vessel,
train, bus, street car, food or food products, goods, wares, equipment, things, apparatus, instruments, persons, animals or registers, or the examination or inspection of the doing of any
and all things or acts necessary and mandatory for him (or them) to do for the purpose of
enforcing all the provisions of this Chapter, the rules and regulations of the Department, or
any health law of the State." Los Angeles Rev. Code (1946) § 31.18.
"The occupant or the owner... managing any dwelling... shall thoroughly clean all the
rooms, passages, floors, windows, doors, walls, ceilings, water closets, privies, cesspools and
drains of the building ... which he... manages or occupies, to the satisfaction of the Health
Officer, as often as shall be required." Ibid., at § 32.00.
"It shall be unlawful for any person to violate any provisions or to fail to comply with any
of the requirements of this Code. Any person violating any provisions or failing to comply with
any of the mandatory requirements of this Code, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor. Any person convicted of a misdemeanor under the provisions of this Code, unless provision is otherwise herein made, shall be punishable by a fine of not more than $50o.0o or by imprisonment
in the City Jail for a period of not more than six months or by both such fine and imprisonment." Ibid., at § ii.0o(m).
1 "The commissioner of buildings, president of the board of health, fire commissioner,
commissioner of public works, commissioner of streets and electricity, commissioner of police,
or any of them and their respective assistants, shall have the right to enter any building, or
premises, and any and all parts thereof, at any reasonable time, and at any time when occupied
by the public in order to examine such building or premises to judge of the condition of the
same and to discharge their respective duties, and it shall be unlawful for any person to interfere with them in the performance of their duties." Chicago Rev. Code (19o9) § 39.3.
"Any person violating or resisting or opposing the enforcement of any of the provisions of
this chapter, where no other penalty is provided, shall be fined not more than two hundred
dollars for each offense ... ." Ibid., at § 39.9.
'3 The information concerning the Chicago Health inspection procedure was gathered
from extended conversations with officials in both the health and law departments of the city.
14 A thorough examination of cases and other sources in Illinois has failed to disclose any
report or opinion in which the matter is discussed.
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to a private dwelling under noncriminal circumstances was argued. Perhaps the
infrequency with which health inspectors have met opposition accounts for the
lack of direct authority on these issues. The District of Columbia has no provision for the granting of a warrant for health inspection. Both counsel for the
District of Columbia and the dissenting opinion in the court of appeals emphasized that this fact should be considered in weighing the social policies of
domestic privacy against the necessity for proper health protection. The majority opinion in the court of appeals sympathized with this position, but
thought that the proper remedy should be supplied by the legislature.
If the Little case had been decided on the grounds that a health inspector
needed a warrant to enter a private dwelling, the decision could have had farreaching importance by applying it to state and municipal health laws through
the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Supreme Court has
consistently held that the first eight amendments of the Constitution are not
directly applicable to the states.s Nevertheless, the states are inhibited by the
Fourteenth Amendment from encroaching on those rights of the first eight
amendments which are "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty."' 6
The clearest expression of the concept "ordered liberty" as applied to the
Fourth Amendment is contained in the recent case of Wolf v. Colorado.'7 In
the Wolf case the Supreme Court was concerned with the applicability of the
due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to a state criminal trial.
One question in the case was whether state officers, acting without a warrant,
could search a private office and seize business records without violating the
Fourth Amendment. The Court held that the search was unconstitutional.
The justices unanimously agreed that the right to be secure in one's home from
the arbitrary entry of the police was implicit in the concept "ordered liberty,"' 8
and therefore enforceable against the states through the due process clause.
If the Little case had required health inspectors to obtain warrants to enter
private dwellings when the owner or occupant objected, it might have caused a
revision of the health laws and practices of many large cities. This is a strong
possibility in view of the Wolf dictum that the right of privacy is enforceable
against the states because it is of the essence of "ordered liberty."
If the Supreme Court had adopted the court of appeals opinion, the Little
case could also have given further definition to the scope of health inspection.
Municipal inspection in the interests of the public health has long been sancIS
Barron v. Baltimore, 7 Pet. (U.S.) 242 (i833); Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46 (1947);
Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78 (r9o8).
'6 Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937).

.7338U.S.

25

(1949).

' 8 As Justice Black stated in his concurring opinion, "A state officer's knock at the door
...as a prelude to a search, without authority of law, may be as our experience shows, just
as ominous to 'ordered liberty' as though the knock were made by a federal officer." Ibid.,
at 40.
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tioned as a valid exercise of the police power,*9 but the inspection of private
dwellings has only been permitted where it has beefL necessary to abate a public
nuisance or where the general health of the community has been endangered by
the failure to observe proper sanitary measures.2 0 As the majority opinion of the
court of appeals in the Little case stated, "If an acute emergency occurs precluding reference to a court or magistrate, public officials must take such steps as
are necessary- to protect the public.' 21 The court emphasized, however, that
"absent such emergency, health laws are enforced by the police power and are
subject to the same constitutional limitations as are other police powers."22
Since inspections are a form of search,23 they are subject to the prohibitions of
the Fourth Amendment. In the absence of these special conditions, however,
there has been a uniform prohibition against any kind of search of a private
19 Keiper v. City of Louisville, 152 Ky. 69x, 154 S.W. 18 (1913); Hubbell v. Higgins, 148
Iowa 36, z26 N.W. 914 (rigo). In the Hubbell case the court said: "The power of the legislature to provide for inspection of premises in the interests of public safety and the public
health is so well established that we will not enter upon a discussion of it." Ibid., at 46 and 918.
20 Text writers concur with the view that a private dwelling may not be entered without a
warrant. Freund says, "The constitutional aspect of inspection is, however, different where it
is extended to interior arrangements of private houses, or personal property kept therein in
private custody. It appears that health authorities often claim the right to enter private houses
to inspect sanitary arrangements, in some cases by express legal authority.... This power
does not seem to have been affirmed or denied by judicial decision; but on principle it would
seem that administrative officers cannot be vested with general power to enter private premises
at any time, except to abate actually existing public nuisances, and that every such inspection
against the will of the owner should be based on judicial compliance with the constitutional
requirements with regard to searches." Freund, Police Power 42-43 (1904).
Worthington advises that "[i]f right of entry to premises for the purpose of inspection is
refused, a warrant may be issued by the board or by a magistrate, as the statute provides,
directing the sheriff or constable, taking such force as may be necessary, and under the direction of the sanitary authorities, to effect an entry and accomplish the purpose for which entry
was required." Parker and Worthington, Public Health and Safety x62 (1892).
21 District of Columbia v. Little, 178 F. 2d 13, 21 (1949).
2

Ibid.

23In the Little case the court of appeals said that the distinction between search and in-

spection "has no basis in semantics, in constitutional history, or in reason. 'Inspect' means to
look at, and 'search' means to look for. To say that the people, in requiring adoption of the
Fourth Amendment, meant to restrict invasion of their homes if govemmnt officials were
looking for something, but not to restrict it if the officials were merely looking, is to ascribe
to the electorate of that day and to the several legislatures and the Congress a degree of irrationality not otherwise observable in their dealings with potential tyranny." Ibid., at M8.
Not all searches and seizures are prohibited by the Fourth Amendment, but only those
which are unreasonable. Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886). The Court indicated in
Go-Bart Importing Co. v. United States, 282 U.S. 344, 357 (i93o), that "[t]here is no formula
for the determination of reasonableness. Each case is to be decided on its own facts and circumstances." See also In re Ginsburg, 147 F. 2d 749 (C.A. 2d, 1945). One criterion of reasonableness is the obtaining of a warrant, as the amendment itself indicates. A warrant may be
issued only if the party seeking it has an interest in the property to be seized, either by possession or by the right to ownership, or a valid exercise of police power requires that the property
be taken. Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. 2o (1925). See also Johnson v. United States,
333 U.S. 1o (i947); Pearson v. United States, i5o F. 2d 219 (C.A. ioth, 1945); Byars v.
United States 273 U.S. 28 (1927).
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dwelling unless a valid warrant has been issued upon probable cause.2 4 In
Agnello v. UnitedStates it was said that "[t]he search of a private dwelling without a warrant is in itself unreasonable and abhorrent to our laws."'' s It would
appear that a statute requiring inspection of every private residence for specific
purposes would be unconstitutional.26 The courts seem to feel that the formality
attending the issuance of a warrant acts as a psychological restraint upon
officers, impressing upon them that the courts are ever watchful of their conduct.
An adjunct to the protection of the right of privacy which the court of appeals upheld in the Little case was a recognition that unauthorized and unregulated searches by government officers might in the future become instruments of
political oppression. Justice Black raised the issue in his concurring opinion in
the Wolf case. In their dissents in Davis v. United States27 and in Zap v. United
Statesal Justices Frankfurter, Murphy and Rutledge vigorously protested that
the right to regulate and inspect does not justify a search without a warrant.
Their opinions indicate an awareness of the problem of modem governmenttrying to regulate large cities and vast economic enterprises. Inspection is certainly a logical means with which to protect the public interest. However, as it
was stressed by the court of appeals in the Little case, "If private homes are
opened to the intrusion of government enforcement officials, at the wish of
those officials, without the intervening mind and hand of a magistrate, one
prop of the structure of our system is gone and an outstanding characteristic of
another form of government will have been substituted."'9 It may be difficult to
24Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20 (1925); Gouled v. United States, 255 U.S. 298
(1921); Amos v. United States, 255 U.S. 313 (1921); Nueslein v. District of Columbia, 115
F. 2d 69o (App. D.C., 194o); Boyd v. United States, 1i6 U.S. 616 (1886). In the Agnello case
the Court remarked that "[wihile the question has never been directly decided by this court,
it has always been assumed that one's house cannot lawfully be searched without a search
warrant, except as an incident to a lawful arrest therein." 269 U.S. 20, 32 (1925). Evidently
the force of the Boyd case and the impact of Entick v. Carrington, igHow. St. Tr. 1029
(1765), erased any notion that a private dwelling could be searched without a warrant. In the
Little case the court of appeals extended this general belief to the peculiar facts of the complaint made to the health officials, one part of which alleged that the occupants of the house
"fail[ed] to avail themselves of the toilet facilities." The court observed that "[lt may be that
the boundary of the curtilage is no longer the outpost of man's domestic independence. It
may be that a transom is debatable access. But even if the front door of the house is no longer
protected by the Constitution, surely it had been thought until now that the bathroom door
is." 178 F. 2d 13, x8 (1949).
2SAgnello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20, at 32 (1925).
26In Williams v. State, xoo Ga. 51,
520, 28 S.E. 624, 627 (x897), the court said, "We believe the framers of the constitution of the United States and of this and other states merely
sought to provide against any attempt, by legislation or otherwise, to authorize, justify, or
declare lawful, any unreasonable search or seizure. This wise restriction was intended to operate upon legislative bodies, so as to render ineffectual any effort to legalize by statute what the
people expressly stipulated could in no event be made lawful."

27328 U.S. 582 (1946).
29District

as328 U.S. 624 (1946).

of Columbia v. Little, 178 F. 2d 13, 6 (1949).
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visualize a threat to liberty in the action of a uniformed health inspector answering a routine complaint. Yet in an era when politically controlled officials
have grown powerful through an ever increasing series of minor infractions of
civil liberties, it would seem prudent to invoke the full force of the constitutional guarantees at every opportunity.30

DIVIDEND CREDITS FOR NONCUMIULATIVE
PREFERRED STOCK
In addition to seniority in the distribution of corporate earnings, the cumulative preferred shareholder receives a credit for dividend arrearages accruing
when earnings are not sufficient to authorize distributions. Yet in some circumstances it may be undesirable to place the potential burden of such arrearages upon the corporation. Upon reorganization or at the commencement of
ventures in which initial years of losses or low profits are anticipated, noncumulative preferred may be a sounder issue. Such stock issues pose a fundamental
problem: do the noncumulative preferred shareholders receive a dividend credit
for those years when profits are legally adequate to permit some distribution
but the directors omit any declaration?
The United States Supreme Court rejected such a dividend credit for noncumulative preferred stock in Wabash Railway Co. v. Barclay., Speaking
through justice Holmes it asserted:
When a man buys stock instead of bonds he takes a greater risk in the business. No

one suggests that he has a right to dividends if there are no net earnings. But the investment presupposes that the business is to go on, and therefore even if there are net
earnings, the holder of stock, preferred as well as common, is entitled to have a dividend declared only out of such part of them as can be applied to dividends consistently
with a wise administration of a going concern. When... the dividends in each fiscal
year were declared to be noncumulative and no net income could be so applied within
the fiscal year referred to in the certificate the right for that year was gone. If the
right is extended further upon some conception of policy, it is enlarged beyond
the
meaning of the contract and the common and reasonable understanding of men.2
These arguments, in the context of the apparently plain meaning of "noncumulative" as against "cumulative," have prevailed in all jurisdictions except
New Jersey.3 The New Jersey position, first expressed in the Cast Iron Pipe
cases, 4 is based upon the belief that in the absence of a dividend credit there is
30 See DeVoto, Due Notice to the FBI, Harper's Magazine (Oct., 1949) at 65.

'28o U.S. 197 (1930).
2280 U.S. 197, 203 (1930).
3But writers have advocated various forms of the dividend credit. See Frey, The Distribution of Corporate Dividends, 89 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 735, 750 et seq. (1941); Berle, Noncumulative Preferred Stock, 23 Col. L. Rev. 358 (1923). Frey asserts that most of the writers
have approved the dividend credit. 89 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 735, 753 (1941).
4 Bassett v. United States Cast Iron Pipe and Foundry Co., 74 N.J. Eq. 668, 7o Atl. 929
(9o8), aff'd 75 N.J. Eq. 539, 73 Atl. 54 (19o9). (A bill to enjoin the corporation from paying

